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INTRODUCTION
"The human mind has first to construct forms, in-
dependently, before we can find them in things."
Albert Einstein.
The power and extent of the human brain is inexplicable. The
genius of imagination is manifold. It manifested the wheel, then the
spaceship; it dressed the humanity in denim jeans, and accentuated it
with a few drops of Chanel; it created vaccines and weapons of mass
destruction. Much of what we see, smell, touch and hear was brought
1 J.D. Candidate, University of Maine School of Law, May, 2010. I would like to
thank my husband, Christian Haag, for his love and support and Professor David
Cluchey, who taught me International Trade Law.
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into life by somebody's mind. Possessed by desire to own numerous
material objects and the power they represent, the man would fight,
flatter and deceive. However, prior to a shaped form there is an imma-
terialized idea. Its value has undoubtedly been known since the dawn
of humanity, but its high price has been only recently defined. 2 Its
name is intellectual property.
"Over the last eight years, the Bush Administration has led a
global fight against counterfeiting and piracy."3 The price America
pays for counterfeiting reaches hundreds of billions of dollars a year.4
Consequently, harmful effects throughout the economy range from se-
rious health and safety risks caused by fake products, to losses in tax
revenues and usage of counterfeit sales to finance illegal groups and
their operations.5 Companies that become targets of counterfeiters
frequently get an injurious slap on their reputation and a subsequent
drop in consumers' demand.
Despite the recent change of administration in the White
House, President-elect Barack Obama's hypnotizing slogans calling for
change are not likely to be reflected in the intellectual property rights
(IPR) situation. According to Clark T. Randt Jr., the United States
Ambassador to China and founder of the 7th Annual Ambassador's
IPR Roundtable, IPR protection is likely to remain "a top priority of
the U.S. government at home and abroad."6 Mr. Obama's selection for
the Secretary of State position reinforces this prognosis. Mrs. Hillary
Clinton has been an avid proponent of a new intellectual property en-
forcement network to strengthen IPR protections.7
Many of the United States IPR-related efforts have been fo-
cused on China, "the global epicenter of counterfeiting and piracy."'
Despite China's impressive steps to prioritize IPR protection and en-
forcement, piracy and counterfeiting levels in China cost United States
2 See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding 13 (Stan-
ford Law and Econ. Olin Working Paper No. 291, 2004), available at http:ll
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=582602.
3 Press Release, Office of the White House Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Protecting
American Innovation (Oct. 13, 2008) (on file with the White House Press Secre-
tary), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/10/20081013-7.
html [hereinafter, Fact Sheet].
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Steven Schwankert, US, China spar over copyright at conference,
NETWORKWORLD, Nov. 7, 2008, available at http://www.networkworld.com/news/
2008/110708-us-china-spar-over-copyright.html?page=1.
7 Press Release, Hilary Clinton for President, Hillary Clinton Calls For Stepped
Up Enforcement of Trade Laws (Apr. 14, 2008) (on file with http://wire52.com),
available at http://www.hillaryclinton.com/news/release/view/?id=7089.
8 Fact Sheet, supra note 3.
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firms and workers billions of dollars each year.9 For example, only
last year the F.B.I., jointly with the Chinese authorities, seized "more
than $500 million worth of counterfeit Microsoft and Symantec
software that was being made in China and distributed worldwide."1 °
However, despite the magnitude of this operation, 82% of the software
used in China today remains counterfeit." Moreover, many counter-
feit products, especially counterfeit medicines, pose a serious risk of
harm to consumers in China, the United States and around the
world.' 2 For example, counterfeit Colgate toothpaste distributed in
the United States and Canada contained poisonous chemicals and
dangerous bacteria, respectively. 3
"In April 2007, the U.S. requested the WTO to dispute settle-
ment consultations with China over deficiencies in China's legal re-
gime for protecting and enforcing copyrights and trademarks on a wide
range of products."' 4 Unfortunately, the consultations did not resolve
the issues and on September 25th the WTO established a formal
panel, requested by the United States, to investigate the matter.' 5
The United States alleges that China has violated the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)' 6 in
several ways. Firstly, China's criminal laws maintain safe harbors
that allow commercial-scale counterfeiting and piracy undeterred by
criminal prosecution or conviction for those acts." Secondly, Chinese
9 Id.
1o David Barboza & Steve Lohr, F.B.I. and Chinese Seize $500 Million of Counter-
feit Software, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2007/07/25/business/worldbusiness/25soft.html.
11 Huge Chinese piracy ring tackled, BBC NEWS, July 26, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.
uk/2/hi/technology/6917127.stm.
12 Press Release, U.S. Trade Representative, United States Files WTO Cases
Against China Over Deficiencies in China's Intellectual Property Rights Laws and
Market Access Barriers to Copyright-Based Industries (Apr. 09, 2007) (on file with
the Office of the United States Trade Representative), available at http://www.
ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary/Press-Releases/2007/April/UnitedStatesFiles WTO
_CasesAgainstChinaOverDeficiencies inChinasIntellectualProperty-
RightsLawsMarketAccessBarr.html.
13 Contaminated Counterfeit Toothpaste Now Found in 6 States, Canada,
FoxNEwS, July 1, 2007, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,287544,00.html
14 OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2008 SPECIAL 301 RE-
PORT (2008), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document-Library/Reports-
Publications/2008/2008_Special_30lReportasset-upload-file702_14868.pdf.
15 Id.
16 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Annex IC, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
17 First Written Submission of the United States, China - Measures Affecting the
Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 87, WT/DS362 (Jan.
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customs officers lack the required authority to dispose of counterfeit
and pirated imports."8 Thirdly, China denies automatic and immedi-
ate copyright protection to certain works, including those that have
not yet cleared China's content review process.1 9
The outcome of this landmark case is of great importance for a
number of reasons. To begin with, it is going to provide substantive
definition of the TRIPS provisions, the interpretation of which until
now has not been invoked in a formal WTO dispute.2 ° Furthermore,
should the United States prevail, the prescribed remedies and China's
reaction are likely to be genuine signs of how effective the WTO dis-
pute settlement mechanism actually is. Although time is the only true
judge, in this paper I will evaluate the United States claims against
China, the potential outcome of the case, and provide certain contextu-
ally based predictions as to the implementation of the Dispute Settle-
ment Body's (DSB) recommendations.
I. RELEVANT LAW
In order to appreciate the existing WTO dispute resolution sys-
tem and its application to the United States claims against China, it is
important to evaluate its predecessor, the General Agreement of Tar-
iffs and Trade ("GATT") dispute settlement procedure, and to under-
stand the reasons why it failed its purpose.2 1
A. The GATT Dispute Settlement Procedure
Article XXIII is the cornerstone of the GATT dispute settlement pro-
cedure.2 2 It provides that a contracting party, whose benefits under
the GATT are "being nullified or impaired", may make "written repre-
sentations or proposals" to the other contracting party or parties con-
cerned.2 3 In response to such representations or proposals, their
recipient shall "give sympathetic considerations" thereto.2 4 If the par-
30, 2008) available at http://www.ifta-online.org/Uploads/Issues/58.pdf [hereinaf-
ter First Submission].18 Id. 56.
19 Id. %1 195-96.
20 See generally Wayne M. Morrison, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CHINA-
U.S. TRADE IssuEs (July 11, 2007), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/
RL33536.pdf (contending that: "The U.S. WTO cases on China's IPR regime re-
present the most comprehensive and complex cases the United states has filed
against any WTO to date").
21 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
22 Id. art. XXII.1.
23 Id.
24 Id.
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ties fail to resolve the dispute among themselves, the petitioner is enti-
tled to bring the complaint before other contracting parties that shall"promptly investigate, make recommendations or give a ruling on the
matter, as appropriate."25 Originally, all of the contracting parties
had to be present at the meeting.26 Later, several alternatives became
available to such a time-consuming and inefficient arrangement. One
of them was a working party, composed of representatives of the dis-
puting countries and of several neutral countries that would conduct
the investigation and make a recommendation.2 ' Another more popu-
lar variant was a panel that consisted of three to five trade experts. 28
The panel was required to act independently of any government and to
be fair and impartial in exercising its judgment.29 After considering
all the arguments, including those of the interested third parties, the
panel would issue a report containing a summary and recommenda-
tions. 30 However, recommendations could be implemented only if all
member states, including the losing member, adopted the panel's re-
port.3 ' If the report did get unanimously adopted and "circumstances
were serious enough to justify such action" the winning party could
retaliate by depriving the offender of concessions or other circumstan-
tially appropriate obligations under the GATT.32
At the onset of the GATT, when its few members were homoge-
neous and supportive of the GATT rules, contracting parties usually
complied with the system in good faith.33 However, as more nations
became contracting parties, less conformity was observed.34 The
unanimous consent requirement of all member states was an obvious
leeway for avoiding any penalty for non-compliance. Under Article
XXIII, a losing party's objection to the panel's decision could not only
veto the adoption of its recommendations, but also indefinitely delay
the creation of the panel itself.35 Obviously, unless all contracting par-
ties voted in good faith, which is not required by Article XXIII, the
25 Id. art. XXII.2.
26 JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 95 (The MIT Press, 1989).
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Philip M. Nichols, GATT Doctrine, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 379, 396 (1996).
31 Id.
32 GATT, supra note 21, art. XXIII.2.
33 Miquel Montafi i Mora, A GATT with Teeth: Law Wins over Politics in the
Resolution of International Trade Disputes, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 103, 108
(1993).
34 Id. at 119-20.
35 See William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 51,
85 (1987).
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petitioner's remedy would be contingent upon turbulent political inter-
ests and the economic might of other member states.3 6 For example,
in 1955 the United States political influence allowed it to circumvent
certain agricultural obligations. 37 Furthermore, those member states
that had been previously injured by the petitioner's veto on the panel's
report could be motivated to cast their veto in retaliation.3 1
Unable to rely on the GATT dispute resolution system to re-
dress their claims any longer, member states began to act unilaterally
through threats and trade sanctions.39  Naturally, such methods
mostly benefited politically and economically strong states, while the
weaker members did not have any effective means of redress. By the
time the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations was commenced in
1986, the necessity for an effective and accessible dispute resolution
mechanism had become a dire priority.4 °
B. The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism
After almost a decade of trade negotiations, the Uruguay Round
culminated in the WTO, which officially came into existence on Janu-
ary 1, 1995. The WTO became the first international organization to
oversee the world trading system, including intellectual property and
services, neither of which was covered by the GATT. 4 With it
emerged a new centralized procedure for resolving trade-related dis-
putes: the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Set-
tlement of Disputes ("DSU").4 2 The preamble to the WTO Charter
calls on the signatories "to develop an integrated, more viable and du-
rable multilateral trading system", contrary to instability and unpre-
dictability of Article XXIII of the GATT.4 3
The DSU, unlike Article XXIII of the GATT, lays out a struc-
tured procedure for dispute resolution arising under the WTO. As
36 See Glen T. Schleyer, Power to the People: Allowing Private Parties to Raise
Claims Before the WTO Dispute Resolution System, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2275,
2284 (1997).
37 JACKSON, supra note 26, at 96.
38 Michael K. Young, Dispute Resolution in the Uruguay Round: Lawyers Triumph
over Diplomats, 29 VA. J. INT'L LAw 389, 399 (1995).
39 Nichols, supra note 30, at 398-99.
40 See G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An
Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DuKE L.J. 829, 845-48 (1995).
41 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1144 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act].
42 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 2, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1226
(1994) [hereinafter DSU].
4 Final Act, supra note 41, pmbl.
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well, it describes the remedies available to successful petitioners and
methods of their enforcement.44 Unlike the GATT, which enabled par-
ties to choose a way of forming a dispute resolution panel based on
their objectives, the WTO contains a single unified nucleus, the Dis-
pute Settlement Body (DSB), which administers all disputes.4 5 Fur-
thermore, the DSU allows parties to appeal the panel's decision to the
Appellate Body, a permanent entity consisting of seven judges.4 6
In addition, the DSU makes the adoption of the panel's and the
Appellate Body's reports almost automatic.4 7 In order to prevent a re-
port from being implemented, the objection must be unanimous, mean-
ing the victorious petitioner must also object.48 Comparatively, under
the GATT, any single party, including the losing respondent, had veto
power, while under the WTO, the victorious petitioner's vote is suffi-
cient to require report implementation.4 9 At the same time, the DSU
requires unanimous consent of all parties in order to delay the estab-
lishment of the panel, while under the GATT a single objection was
enough to cause an indefinite delay.5 ° Essentially, the DSU seeks to
ensure that the petitioner shall have an opportunity to be heard, re-
gardless of other members' personal interests and influences.
Remarkably, while the GATT imposed virtually no time limita-
tions and panels could deliberate on numerous sessions for
months, 51the DSU effectively imposes strict procedural time frames
for disputing parties, 2 the panel,58 the Appellate body5 4 and the
DSB5 5 .
The DSU's enforcement mechanism has been another impres-
sive step forward. Under Article XXIII of the GATT, the panel's power
was limited to authorizing the injured party to impose sanctions
against the violator. 5 6 Unfortunately, if the victorious party was eco-
nomically and/or politically weaker than the transgressor, the latter
could evade the sanctions and proceed with its offensive practices. 57
" See Schleyer, supra note 36, at 2286.
45 DSU, supra note 42, art. 2.
46 Id. art. 17.
47 Schleyer, supra note 36, at 2286.
48 DSU, supra note 42, arts. 16.4, 17.14.
49 See Shell, supra note 40, at 850.
50 See Davey, supra note 35, at 81-89 (describing the problems of the GATT dis-
pute settlement system).
51 Nichols, supra note 30, at 395-96.
52 See DSU, supra note 42, arts. 12.5, 12.6, 15.1, 15.3.
53 Id. arts. 12.3, 12,8, 12.9, 21.5.
54 Id. art. 17.5.
55 Id. arts. 20, 21.4.
56 GATT, supra note 21, at art. XXIII.2.
57 See JACKSON, supra note 26, at 96.
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Contrarily, the DSU ensures continuous observance of the violator's
steps taken in order to comply with the recommendations."8 Finally,
Article twenty-three of the DSU grants the WTO unilateral power to
impose sanctions on other members. 59
1. Report Implementation under the DSU
According to Article 19 of the DSU, where the panel or Appel-
late Body finds the measure inconsistent with a covered agreement, it
shall recommend the violating member "bring the measure in conform-
ity with that agreement" and may also recommend ways to implement
the suggested changes.6 ° Article 21 emphasizes the importance of"prompt compliance with recommendation or rulings of the DSB" for
effective dispute resolution. 6 However, the DSU allows, where imme-
diate compliance is impractical, to act within a reasonable period of
time, which can be any period of time proposed by the violator and
approved by the DSB.6 2 Absent such approval, the time should be mu-
tually agreed upon by the parties within forty-five days after the adop-
tion of the report, or determined by arbitration within ninety days
after the adoption of the report provided. 6 3 With some variations de-
pending on circumstances, such implementation shall not exceed fif-
teen months from the day of the adoption of the report.64 Absent
exceptional circumstances, the time from the establishment of the
panel by the DSB until the determination of a reasonable implementa-
tion time shall not exceed eighteen months.6 5 In addition, "the DSB
shall keep under surveillance the implementation of adopted recom-
mendations or rulings."6 6 If there is a dispute regarding whether the
suggested measures are being implemented, it can be brought to the
attention of the DSB at any time and shall be decided through the
dispute settlement procedures provided in the DSU.6 7 Also, the origi-
nal panel shall be resorted to whenever possible.6"
58 See DSU, supra note 42, art. 21.6.
59 See Young, supra note 38, at 400-01.
60 DSU, supra note 42, art. 19.
61 Id. art. 21.1.
62 Id. art. 21.3.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id. art. 21.4.
66 Id. art. 21.6.
67 Id.
68 Id. art. 21.5.
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2. Temporary Measures When Implementation is Delayed or Fails
When "the recommendations and rulings are not implemented
within a reasonable period of time," Article 22 of the DSU provides for
temporary measures such as compensation, which must be voluntary
and consistent with other agreements, and suspension of conces-
sions.6 9 Both are only temporary measures and shall be terminated
upon implementation of the measures in conformity with the agree-
ment.70 Thus, if a respondent fails to comply with recommendations
and rulings within reasonable time, it shall enter into negotiations
with the petitioner in order to develop a mutually acceptable compen-
sation.7 1 However, if twenty days after the expiration of the reasona-
ble time no consensus regarding the compensation has been reached,
the petitioner is allowed to request authorization from the DSB to sus-
pend the application to the respondent concerning concessions or other
obligations under the covered agreements.7 2 Furthermore, Article 22
lists principles and procedures, which must be considered in deciding
which concessions to suspend.7 3 Depending on whether it is practical
and effective, the petitioner should seek to suspend the concessions
with respect to the same sectors where violations have occurred and
then other sectors of agreement. 4 Other concessions or obligations
under another covered agreement shall be suspended only if the cir-
cumstances are serious enough. 7' The petitioner should also take into
account the importance of trade to the petitioner state in the sector
where the violation has occurred, as well as the broader economic ele-
ments related to the violation and the broader economic consequences
of the suspension of concessions.7 6 Moreover, the level of concessions
suspended must be equivalent to the level of impairment or nullifica-
tion.7 7 Concessions cannot be suspended if prohibited by a covered
agreement.78 If the respondent objects to the substance or procedure
of the suspension of concessions, preferably the original board or an
arbitrator appointed by the Director-General shall carry out the arbi-
tration.7 9 The results of such arbitration are final.8 0
69 Id. art. 22.1.
70 Id.
71 Id. art. 22.2.
72 Id.
73 Id. art. 22.3.
74 Id. art. 22.3(a).
75 Id. art. 22.3(c).
76 Id. art. 22.3(d)(i)-(ii).
77 Id. art. 22.4.
78 Id. art. 22.5.
79 Id. art. 22.6.
80 Id. art. 22.7.
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Essentially, the WTO has comprehensively reformed the dis-
pute resolution mechanism, obviating the need for individual countries
to act unilaterally, and granting every member, regardless of its devel-
opment status, equal access to justice.
C. The TRIPS Agreement
Undoubtedly, the TRIPS agreement is one of the WTO's most
remarkable innovations. It is the first international trade agreement
that unifies into a single multilateral framework of principles diverse
IPR that were previously protected by subject-specific agreements,
such as the Berne, Paris and Rome Conventions." Since the TRIPS
agreement is one of the WTO treaties, the DSU principles apply to
IPR-related disputes.s 2 Thus, a victorious petitioner may not only ob-
tain the judgment in its favor, but also adequate remedy and its
implementation.
Essentially, the TRIPS agreement is a 'minimum standards'
agreement.8 3 It requires neither the creation of a separate and dis-
tinct legal body for IPR enforcement, nor uniformity of IPR enforce-
ment in all member states.8 4 Rather, the TRIPS agreement attempts
to reconcile various ways of IPR protection in different member states
by establishing mandatory minimum levels of protection that each
government must provide to the intellectual property of other WTO
members. 85
Overall, the TRIPS agreement addresses the application of the
basic principles of the GATT and other international intellectual prop-
erty agreements such as the Berne and Paris conventions; availability
of adequate protections of IPR; enforcement of IPR by countries on
their own territories; settlement of IPR disputes between the WTO
members; and special arrangements during the transitional period. 6
While Part I of the TRIPS agreement lays out general princi-
ples of the agreement, it also emphasizes a national-treatment com-
81 Laurence R. Helfer, Adjudicating Copyright Claims Under the TRIPS Agree-
ment: The Case For a European Human Rights Analogy, 39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 357,
358 (1998).
82 See id. at 358.
83 Id.
84 See TRIPS, supra note 16, art. 1.1.
85 World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: The Agreements, Intellec-
tual Property: Protection and Enforcement, http://www.wto.int/English/thewtoe/
whatise/tif e/agrm7_e.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2009) [hereinafter Understand-
ing the WTO].
86 GATT Focus Newsletter (1993), available in John H. Jackson et al., LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 1003 (5th ed. 2008) [hereinaf-
ter GATT Focus].
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mitment8  This principle of non-discrimination obliges each WTO
member to treat other WTO members no less favorably than it treats
its own nationals with regard to IPR protection.88 Also, a unique fea-
ture of the TRIPS agreement, compared to prior international conven-
tions, is a most-favored-nation clause under which any advantage a
member state gives to nationals of one foreign state must be automati-
cally extended to nationals of all member states.8 9 Thus, authors of
computer programs and producers of sound recordings can authorize
or prohibit the commercial rental of their works.9 ° In addition, the
Berne Convention calls for protection of performers from unauthorized
recording and broadcasting of live performances. 91
For the purposes of this paper, Part III of the TRIPS, desig-
nated "Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights", is of particular
interest. Article 41 requires that "members shall ensure enforcement
procedures as specified in this Part are available under their law so as
to permit effective action against any act of infringement of intellec-
tual property rights covered by this Agreement."92 Specifically, mem-
ber governments must provide procedures and remedies under their
domestic law to ensure "fair and equitable" IPR enforcement, which is
not "unnecessarily complicated or costly, or entails unreasonable time-
limits or unwarranted delays."93 Article 41.4 requires that judicial re-
view of final administrative decisions shall be available, except for re-
view of acquittals in criminal cases.9 4 Importantly, Article 41.5
explicitly provides that member states shall not be required to create a
separate judicial system for IPR enforcement distinct from an existing
general law enforcement system.95 IPR enforcement should not "affect
the capacity of Members to enforce their law in general" and does not
need to be prioritized in the distribution of resources.96
Although the TRIPS does not mandate prioritizing the subsidi-
zation of IPR,97 considerable investment is still inherently required to
meet the minimum standards. Thus, developing countries may argue
that an imposition of costly minimum standards deprives them of fi-
nances necessary for medicine, education and the development of in-
frastructure. However, since counterfeit goods manufactured in
87 Id.
88Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 TRIPS, supra note 16, art. 41.1.
93 Id. art. 41.2.
94 Id. art. 41.4.
95 Id. art. 41.5.
96 id.
97 See id. art. 41.
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developing countries often injure the economy and consumers of devel-
oped states, such minimum standards mandatory to all WTO members
are reasonable and necessary to deter global IPR violations. Another
criticism of Article 41 has been that the "minimum standards" versus
"the best" standard of compliant behavior, make it difficult to estimate
the bottom of the minimum, especially since intellectual property is
intangible.9" However, "the best" standard may be higher and more
difficult to comply with. Potentially, outraged developing countries
could refuse to comply en masse, which may cause the repetition of the
tragic fate of Article XXIII of the GATT.
The civil and administrative procedures and remedies section
of TRIPS includes provisions on evidence, proof, injunctions and dam-
ages. The TRIPS also specifies the right of judicial authorities to order
the disposal or destruction of counterfeit imports outside the channels
of commerce.9 9 Judicial authorities shall also order prompt and effec-
tive provisional measures, especially when delay is likely to cause ir-
reparable harm to the right holder, or when evidence is likely to be
destroyed. 10 0 Further provisions encompass measures that customs
officers are authorized to take after suspending counterfeit and pi-
rated goods at the border. For example, Article 59 requires that cus-
toms officers shall be authorized to destroy or dispose of infringing
goods outside of the channels of commerce. 10 1
Finally, Article 61 sets minimum standards that trigger crimi-
nal prosecution. It requires that parties shall provide for criminal pro-
cedures and penalties at least in cases of willful trademark
counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale.' 0 2 Available
remedies shall include imprisonment and/or monetary fines sufficient
to effectively deter crimes of similar magnitude. 10 3
In addition, the Council for the TRIPS shall monitor the opera-
tion of the agreement and member states' compliance.'0 4 According to
Article 64, the dispute settlement shall be governed by "Articles XXII
and XXIII of GATT 1994 as elaborated and applied by the [DSU]."'0 5
The drafters of the TRIPS appear to recognize inherent difficul-
ties certain WTO members might face when implementing the TRIPS
requirements due to their lack of economic development. This is ap-
98 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements in
the Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J.
INT'L L. 275, 281-83, 331-33 (1997).
99 TRIPS, supra note 16, art. 61.100 Id. art. 50.
101 Id. art. 59.
102 Id. art. 61.
103 id.
104 Id. art. 63.
105 Id. art. 64.
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parent as the TRIPS provides developing countries with a 5-year tran-
sition period and countries in the process of transformation from a
centrally-planned into a market economy, with an 11-year transition
period to bring their legislation and practices into conformity with the
TRIPS."0 6 In comparison, the developed countries were permitted one
year to comply.' 0 7
II. CASE STUDY: UNITED STATES V. CHINA
China and the United States have been working together to
advance IPR observance and effective ways of IPR enforcement. The
U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT), in con-
junction with the high-level U.S.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue
established in September 2006, are the main vehicles through which
the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) together with the
Department of Commerce, cooperate with China on IPR issues.10 8 The
USTR and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office co-chair the JCCT's
IPR Working Group (IPRWG) with China's Ministry of Commerce. 109
As noted by the United States Trade Representative, "American and
Chinese agencies responsible for IPR protection and enforcement meet
regularly in the IPRWG to discuss IPR issues." 10 Furthermore, an
open strategic framework for related issues was created by the initia-
tion of the Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED).111
However, despite this complex framework of bilateral negotia-
tions, the U.S. has chosen to address its concerns through the WTO
dispute resolution system. Moreover, the EC, Japan, Canada, and
Mexico joined the U.S.'s request for consultations. 112 This may indi-
cate that, despite optimistic press releases emphasizing the two coun-
tries' cooperation in the IPR sphere, the United States and China have
so far failed to secure practical solutions.
The importance of intellectual property for twenty first century
society gives the United States suit against China phenomenal signifi-
cance. 113 It represents a chance for the DSU to reveal to the world
106 Id. art. 65.
107 id.
108 Press Release, U.S. Trade Representative, supra note 12.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Panel Report, Dispute Settlement, China - Measures Affecting the Protection
and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362 (May 30, 2007) [here-
inafter Measures Affecting Protection Panel Report].
113 EU, Mexico Seek to Join China WTO Talks, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, May 1,
2007, www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/05/01/business/EU-FIN-ECO-WTO-China-
Piracy.php.
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through its decision and its effective enforcement the supremacy of the
WTO dispute settlement system and the true benefits of WTO
membership.
To better understand the contextual significance of this case, I
would like to provide a brief overview of China's legal system and its
current position in the world economy.
A. China's Economy
Since 1978 when Deng Xiaoping came to power, China has en-
joyed a spectacular economic growth rate averaging 9.8% per year. 114
Meanwhile, after joining the WTO in 2001, China has become increas-
ingly dependent on foreign markets, with a staggering 38% of its
growth attributable to exports.115 Today, in the face of worldwide re-
cession, China's booming economy is at its slowest rate, with economy
expansion of just 9% in the third quarter, compared to the 10.6%
growth in the first quarter and 10.1% in the second quarter of 2008.116
Such a slowdown is explained mainly by a decline in exports. 117 In
southern China, factories that have relied on exporting to the U.S. and
other wealthy nations have begun closing down and laying off
thousands of workers. 1 18 Chinese President Hu Jintao stated that de-
spite the challenges and difficulties China is facing due to the global
financial crisis, "the fundamentals of China's economy have not
changed.""' He emphasized the necessity of expanding consumer de-
mand and maintaining economic financial stability while continuing to
promote rapid economic development. 120 Thus, China's primary focus
has shifted from controlling inflation to boosting growth with fiscal
and monetary measures, assuming that with a small number of ad-
justments and a large amount of spending, the country can buy its way
out of crisis.' 2 ' However, some experts believe that despite such mea-
sures as a new value-added tax rebate and new incentives for the real
estate sector, the program will fail because it relies on a flawed as-
sumption. 12 2 Experts suggest that the true reason lies with consum-
114 Gordon G. Chang, Beijing Bust?, FORBES, Oct. 23, 2008, available at http://
www.forbes.com/opinions/2008/10/23/china-economy-bust-oped-cx-gc1024chang.
html.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 See id.
118 Id.
119 Hu says fundamentals of China's economy have not changed despite crisis,
ASIAN PAC. NEWS, Oct. 24, 2008, available at http://www.channelnewsasia.com/
stories/afp-asiapacific/view/385150/1/.html.
120 Id.
121 See Chang, supra note 114.
122 See id.
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ers' unwillingness to consume and not with their inability to afford
Chinese goods.123
The impact of the international financial crisis on China is at
least two-fold. On the one hand, it may reveal such issues as bad
loans, corruption, environmental problems, unfunded social welfare
obligations that were caused by China's heavy reliance on exports; is-
sues once disguised by China's economic success. 124 The economic
slowdown may motivate China to be more sensitive to the concerns of
major export markets, including the United States' complaints regard-
ing China's flawed IPR protection and enforcement.
B. Relevant Features of the Chinese Legal System
With written records dating back 4,000 years, China is one of
the four great ancient civilizations of the world. 125 China introduced
gunpowder, papermaking, printing and the compass to the world. 126
As noted by Assistant Commerce Minister Chong Quan, China estab-
lished a high level IPR protection system in line with international
practices in twenty years; by comparison Europe and the United
States took hundreds of years to set up a similar system.127
However, for a long time and with few interruptions, China's
clan-based society was governed by the emperor, who was not only the
ruler of the country but also the ultimate source of law.1 2 ' Only in
2004 did China amend its 1982 constitution to mandate the rule of the
country by law.' 29 In 2007, the 17th Communist Party of China's Na-
tional Congress expressly called for a comprehensive implementation
and strengthening of the fundamental principle of rule of law in the
country. 130 However, the independence of the Chinese judiciary, a
necessary element of the rule of law, remains uncertain.' Under the
current regime, unilaterally dominated by the Communist party, it is
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Formation of the Chinese Civilization, CHINA INTERNET INFORMATION CENTER,
http://www.china.org.cn/e-gudai/index.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2009).
126 Formation of the Chinese Civilization: The Four Great Inventions, CHINA IN-
TERNET INFORMATION CENTER, http://www.china.org.cn/e-gudai/8.htm (last visited
Feb. 8, 2009).
127 China defends efforts to protect intellectual property rights, AFP, Nov. 6, 2008,
http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5gvZkF6DVnobjsVshdKFonDQJTplA.
128 Mo Zhang, Rule of Law and Judicial Independence in China, Dedication to
Dean Robert J. Reinstein, 80 TEMP L. REV. 627, 645 (2007).
129 Id.
130 The State Council Information Office, China, China's Efforts and Achieve-
ments in Promoting the Rule of Law, 7 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 513, 516 (2008).
131 Zhang, supra note 128, at 646.
2009]
442 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 8:3
unlikely that China's judiciary will exercise its judgment independent
of the government which secures the positions of sitting judges. 13 2
Many laws have been enacted to create a complete legal system
for the protection of the IPR. These laws include:
Patent Law, Trademark Law, Copyright Law and Law
on Countering Unfair Competition, and the promulga-
tion of a series of administrative regulations, including
the Regulations on the Protection of Computer Software,
Regulations on the Protection of Layout-design of Inte-
grated Circuits, Regulations on the Collective Manage-
ment of Copyrights, Regulations on the Protection of
Dissemination of Information Through Internet, Regula-
tions on Customs Protection of Intellectual Property
Rights and Regulations on the Protection of New Vari-
eties of Plants. 13 3
Today, according to the Constitution and the Law on Legisla-
tion of the People's Republic of China, the National People's Congress
(NPC) is the highest organ of power. 1 34 Together with the Standing
Committee as its permanent body the NPC exercises the legislative
power of the State, including the power to formulate China's laws.' 3 5
China's highest judicial body is the Supreme People's Court ("SPC").
Its primary functions include hearing appeals, supervising the work of
local courts, and giving judicial interpretations of the specific utiliza-
tion of laws.' 36 Meanwhile, the Supreme People's Procuratorate
("SPP") and other lower procuratorates administer an independent le-
gal supervisory system that makes decisions on arrest and prosecu-
tion.' 37  Importantly, the NPC and Standing Committee have
delegated some of its legislative powers to the SPC and the SPP al-
lowing them to make legally enforceable binding interpretations of
questions involving the specific applications of laws and decrees in
court trials and procuratorial work respectively.'1 3
1. China's Thresholds for Criminal Penalties and Procedures for
Trademark Counterfeiting and Copyright Piracy.
The Chinese law requires that certain acts of IPR infringement
shall be criminally prosecuted only when specific monetary or volume-
132 Id.
133 State Council, supra note 130, at 528.
134 Id. at 518.
135 See id.
136 Id. at 534.
137 See id. at 537.
138 Id.
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based thresholds are met.'39 The Criminal Law of the People's Repub-
lic of China ("Criminal Law") lists the legal requirements, while the
SPC and SPP further define them in their joint binding interpreta-
tions: (1) the Interpretation by the Supreme People's Court and the
Supreme People's Procuratorate of Several Issues Concerning the Spe-
cific Application of Law in Handling Criminal Cases Involving In-
fringement of Intellectual Property Rights ("December 2004 JI"), and
(2) the Interpretation by the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme
People's Procuratorate of Several Issues Concerning the Specific Appli-
cation of Law in Handling Criminal Cases of Infringement of Intellec-
tual Property Rights (II) ("April 2007 JI"). When December 2004 JI
and April 2007 JI conflict, the latter controls.1 40
Illegal IPR infringement, which will result in criminal penal-
ties in China, is defined in Part Two, Chapter III, Section 7 of China's
Criminal Law.' 4 1 Various trademark counterfeiting and piracy acts
are specifically criminalized under Articles 213, 214 and 215, and Arti-
cles 217 and 218, respectively.' 42 However, under the Criminal Law
only piracy and counterfeiting that involve either "illegal gains" that
are "relatively large" or "enormous" "circumstances" that are "serious"
or "especially serious" can trigger criminal prosecution.' 43 The De-
cember 2004 JI and the April 2007 JI further specify monetary and
quantitative minimums to fit the legal standards set out in the Crimi-
nal Law.' 44 Thus, to be subjected to criminal prosecution, the in-
fringer must realize a minimum "illegal business volume" (USD $
6,925), obtain minimum amounts of "illegal gains" (USD $4,155), or
produce a minimum number of "illegal copies" (500 copies). 145 Impor-
tantly, the controlling April 2007 JI lowered the threshold for the min-
imum number to 500 copies from 1000, as previously required by the
December 2004 JI.14 6
2. China's Measures Regarding the Disposal of Infringing Goods
Confiscated by the Customs Authorities.
The Regulations of the People's Republic of China for Customs
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights ("Customs IPR Regula-
tions"), the Implementing Measures of Customs of the People's Repub-
lic of China for the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on
139 First Submission, supra note 17, 25.
140 Id. 34 (citations omitted).
141 Id. 31.
142 Id.
143 Id. 33.
144 Id. T 34.
145 First Submission, supra note 17, 41.
146 Id. T 50.
20091
444 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 8:3
Customs Protection of Intellectual Property Rights ("Customs IPR Im-
plementing Measures"), and Announcement No. 16 of the General Ad-
ministration of Customs ("Customs Announcement No. 16") lay out a
hierarchical set of rules that the Chinese customs authorities shall fol-
low when dealing with counterfeit goods seized at the border.1 47 Es-
sentially, customs authorities are first required to attempt to sell the
seized goods to the right holder or, alternatively, transfer them to pub-
lic welfare organizations. If this cannot be done, they may then auc-
tion them off after removing the infringing features. Only as a means
of last resort are the customs officers authorized to destroy the seized
counterfeit goods. 141
3. Article 4 of China's Copyright Law
"The Copyright Law of the People's Republic of China ('Copy-
right Law') provides the legal basis for protecting and enforcing the
copyrights of authors in their literary, artistic and scientific works as
well as 'related rights' in China." 149 Importantly, Article 4 provides
that "[w]orks[,] the publication or distribution of which is prohibited
by law[,] shall not be protected by this Law."' 5 ° The Chinese law
might prohibit the publication or distribution of a certain work for va-
rious reasons, one of which is the work's content.15 ' In addition, IPR
protection can be compromised up until the moment the work receives
censorship approval, thus falling into the secure zone of Article 4. For
example, the Regulation on the Administration of Films governs the"production, import, export, distribution and screening of films within
the territory of the People's Republic of China."' 5 2 It also provides
that "for some time after a film's creation, and until that film has been
submitted for and has completed the content review, the film cannot
be imported, distributed or projected." 5 3 Similarly, publications, au-
dio and video products and electronic publications all possess prohibi-
tions on publication and distribution until such time that a content
review process has been successfully completed. 15 4
147 Id. IT 56-57.
148 Id. I 58-61.
149 Id. 1 62.
150 Id. 67.
151 See id. 71.
152 Id. 72 (citing State Council Order No. 342, ST. COUNCIL GAz., art. 2 (Dec. 25,
2001)).
153 Id. 1I 77.
154 Id. 1 78.
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C. The United States' Claims before the WTO
In its complaint against China, the United Sates alleges three
TRIPS violations. First, China's threshold system prevents certain
commercial scale counterfeiting and piracy acts from criminal prosecu-
tion, violating Article 61 of the TRIPS.155 Second, China's failure to
entrust its customs officers with authority to destroy counterfeit and
pirated imports violates Article 59 of the TRIPS. 15 6 Third, China's re-
quirement of censorship approval as a necessary pre-requisite of copy-
right protection contradicts the automatic and immediate copyright
protection duty under Articles 5(1) and 5(2) of the Berne Convention
and Article 14 of the TRIPS.'5 7
The United States advances several reasons why China's ef-
forts in these three areas have been insufficient. First, Article 61 of
the TRIPS requires that, "[m]embers shall provide for criminal proce-
dures and penalties to be applied at least in cases of wilful trademark
counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale."' In this
case "at least" indicates the mandatory minimum applicable to the rest
of the sentence, i.e., "willful trademark counterfeiting or copyright
piracy on commercial scale." 5 9 Here, the essence of the controversy
lies in the interpretation of what constitutes "commercial scale."' 6 °
Following the customary rules of interpretation of the Vienna
Convention as required by Article 3.2 of the DSU, the United States
interprets "scale" as "of certain extent or magnitude", and "commer-
cial" as linked "to the commercial market place."'' Thus, according to
the United States, "commercial scale" in its ordinary meaning extends
to those who engage in commercial activities, including manufactur-
ing, distribution and retail sales.' 62 On the other hand, China con-
tends that such interpretation is unreasonable since it could require
criminal prosecution even for one pirated copy.' 63 Instead, China sug-
gests that "commercial scale" should be understood as "significant
155 See id. 87.
156 Id. 170.
157 Id. $ 210, 213.
158 TRIPS, supra note 16, art. 61.
159 First Submission, supra note 17, 93.
160 Id. 95.
161 Id. 109.
162 Id.
163 See Executive Summary of the Oral Statement of the United States of America
at the Second Substantive Meeting of the Panel, China - Measures Affecting the
Protection and Enforcement of IPR, WT/DS362 (June 30, 2008), available at http:l!
www.ustr.gov/assets/TradeAgreements/Monitoring-EnforcementiDisputeSettle
ment/WTO/DisputeSettlementListings/asset upload-file781 14436.pdf [herein-
after Oral Statement].
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magnitude" and bases such interpretation on "common usage. "164
However, China has presented no evidence that the Uruguay Round of
negotiations relied on the sources cited by China.'6 5 Also, China's ar-
gument does not take into account that the approach suggested by the
United States is not simply numerical, but instead, it involves a fact-
specific, case-by-case determination based on consideration of such rel-
evant factors as:
"the market for the infringed goods, the object of the in-
fringement, the magnitude or extent of the infringement,
the value of the infringed goods, whether the infringer is
seeking financial gain, the means of producing the in-
fringing goods, the means of distributing the infringing
goods, the marketing and solicitation of business, the in-
tended use of the infringing goods, the impact of the in-
fringement on the right holder, and the involvement of
organized crime.' 6 '
Currently, China's laws do not provide for criminal prosecution
or conviction of piracy and counterfeiting acts unless they meet specific
quantitative or value thresholds, regardless of whether they fall
within "commercial scale" as interpreted by the United States. 6 7
While Article 61 of the TRIPS requires a legal regime that criminalizes
all willful counterfeiting and piracy on a commercial scale, China's
purely numerical thresholds potentially ignore whole classes of "com-
mercial scale" piracy and counterfeiting. 6 s Not surprisingly, statisti-
cal information has revealed that the lowest relevant threshold is met
by less than twenty percent of establishments deemed to be selling
copyright-infringing music CD's or DVD's. 16 9 Moreover, the very es-
sence of the Chinese marketplace, composed of small manufacturers,
middlemen, and distributors, indicates the ease with which counter-
feiters adjust to the existing standards and avoid criminal sanc-
tions. 170 For example, each page of the seizure data provided by the
"The Report on Copyright Complaints, Raids and Resulting Criminal
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 See generally First Submission, supra note 17, $1 111-63 (discussing the ab-
sence of any form of commercial scale threshold to the Chinese statutory provi-
sions and the implications of this absence upon international IPR, specifically
those involving the United States).
168 Id.
169 Id. 6.
170 Executive Summary of the Closing Statement of the United States of America
at the Second Substantive Meeting of the Panel, China - Measures Affecting the
Protection and Enforcement of IPR, 3, WT/DS362 (June 30, 2008) available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade-Agreements/Monitoring-Enforcement/Dispute-
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Actions in China in Exhibit US-41", listed a business operating on a"commercial scale", yet below China's thresholds and beyond the reach
of criminal prosecution.' 71
In its second complaint, the United States alleges that Chinese
customs officers' lack of authority to order the destruction or disposal
of infringing goods according with the principles of Article 46 of the
TRIPS, is inconsistent with Article 59 of the TRIPS. 172 Article 59 pro-
vides that "competent authorities shall have the authority to order the
destruction or disposal of infringing goods in accordance with the prin-
ciples set out in Article 46." 17' The principles referred to include the
authority to destroy infringing goods or to dispose of them outside the
channels of commerce so as to avoid harm to the right holder. 174 More-
over, removing an unlawfully affixed trademark will not suffice to al-
low the release of the good into the channels of commerce, other than
in exceptional cases.' 7 5 However, Article 27 of the Customs IPR Regu-
lations and Article 30 of the Customs IPR Implementing Measures re-
quires Chinese customs officers to follow a mandatory set of rules in
deciding how to treat imported counterfeit goods.' 7 6 Customs officers
must first estimate whether the seized goods can be used for "public
good", and if so, donate them to an appropriate "public welfare organi-
zation."' 7 7 Alternatively, customs officers may offer the right holder to
purchase the seized goods.' Such an option, however, fails to meet
Article 46 of the TRIPS requirement to "avoid any harm . . . to the
right holder", since the owner will still suffer the harm in the amount
of the price she has to pay for the goods.' 79 Arguably, it is unwise to
destroy products that might, for example, be donated to the poor in
developing countries and thus serve a socially beneficial purpose.
However, the stubborn propensity of fake Louis Vuitton and Rolex
products to turn up in Amsterdam or New York City clearly diffuses
the likelihood that counterfeit goods are staying within developing
countries' borders. If neither the donation, nor the sale to the right
holder option is available, customs officers must auction the seized
goods.18 0 Such method not only precludes the destruction of the goods,
SettlementWTO/DisputeSettlementListings/asset-upload-file708_14436.pdf
[hereinafter, Closing Statement].
171 Id.
172 First Submission, supra note 17, 172.
173 TRIPS, supra note 16, art. 59.
174 First Submission, supra note 17, 175.
175 Id. 178.
176 Id. T1 179.
177 Id. 91 180.
178 Id.
179 Id. 183.
180 Id. j 188.
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but also introduces them back into the stream of commerce.'" In ad-
dition, the harm inflicted on the rightful owner is not much different
than the one resulting from the actual sale of counterfeit goods.' 8 2 Ar-
ticle 46 of the TRIPS prohibits the seized goods from re-entering the
channels of commerce even after the unlawfully affixed trademark is
removed unless there are "exceptional circumstances." s3 Paradoxi
cally, the Chinese legal standard has instead pushed the option to de-
stroy the seized goods into a rare "exceptional circumstances"
category. 14
The third United States claim addresses China's denial of copy-
right and related rights protection and enforcement to works that have
not yet received censorship approval in China.'" 5 According to Article
4.1 of the Copyright Law, "[wiorks the publication or distribution of
which is prohibited by law shall not be protected by this Law."' 8 6
Under the TRIPS and the Berne Convention, to which China is a
party, a work almost always acquires copyright protection immedi-
ately and automatically upon the work's creation and copyright is not
conditional upon application and registration.'8 7 Among minimum
rights provided in Article 5(1) of the Berne Convention is the right to
authorize and, by implication, prohibit certain economic activities,
such as reproduction, translation, adaptation and some others.' 8 8
Furthermore, Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention provides that the
exercise of the rights listed in Article 5(1) "shall not be subject to any
formality." s 9 Meanwhile, the standards for copyright review and for
estimating what is "prohibited by law" for the purposes of Article 4.1
overlap.' 9 ° This makes copyright protection in China subject to the
formality of content review, which violates Article 5(2) of the Berne
Convention.
Essentially, the main flaw in China's design of its copyright
protection laws is China's failure to differentiate between censorship
and creators' right to authorize or prohibit certain uses of their works
by third persons. 9 ' Such failure has created a comical situation
181 Id. T 189.
182 Id.
183 TRIPS, supra note 16, art. 46.
184 First Submission, supra note 17, 190.
'85 Id. T 196.
186 Id. 21, 217.
187 Id. 215.
188 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, as amended, July 14, 1967, art. 5.1, 1971 WL 123138, 828 U.N.T.S. 221
[hereinafter Berne Convention].
189 Id. art. 5.2.
190 Oral Statement, supra note 163, 26.
191 Oral Statement, supra note 163, T 24.
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where authentic works are officially prohibited by the Chinese author-
ities, while their pirated copies are widely available to the Chinese
consumers.' 9 2 Importantly, the TRIPS does not obligate China, or any
other WTO member, to authorize publishing and distribution of all
works. What it does require is to protect and enforce the copyright of
the works it prohibits. 19 3
Thus, since Article 4 of the Copyright Law denies copyright
protection to works absent censorship approval, no criminal proce-
dures or remedies are available, even when piracy occurs on a commer-
cial scale, which violates Articles 41 and 61 of the TRIPS. 194
1. Current Status of the Case and Future Predictions.
A United States trade official has recently announced that the
panel ruled in favor of the United States on two counts and in favor of
China on one count.' 9 5 According to trade sources, China's measures
barring copyright protection for movies, music and books that have not
been approved by state censors for legitimate sale in the Chinese mar-
ket violate the TRIPS.' 6 The panel has also ruled that auctioning of
seized counterfeit goods after the infringing trademark is removed is a
clear violation of the TRIPS.' 97 However, the panel cast its votes in
support of China's threshold system for criminal prosecution.' 9 8
China's status as a developing country and its recent adjustment of
the thresholds necessary for criminal prosecution from 1000 to 500
copies' 99 could be a possible explanation for this outcome. By ruling
two matters in favor of the United States and one matter in favor of
China, the panel has probably sent a signal that IPR violations and
non-compliance with the TRIPS agreement will not go unpunished; yet
it still wanted to praise and encourage China's efforts, as a developing
country, to create an effective legal system for IPR protection within
such a short period of time.
192 First Submission, supra note 17, 200.
193 Executive Summary of the First Submission of the United States of America,
China - Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights, T 1, WT/DS362 (Feb. 8, 2008) available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/
TradeAgreementsMonitoringEnforcement/DisputeSettlementWTO/Dispute_
SettlementListings/asset-uploadfile352_14436.pdf [hereinafter Submission
Summary].
194 See id. 13.
195 See, e.g., Measures Affecting Protection Panel Report, supra note 112.
196 Doug Palmer, US claims win in WTO piracy case versus China, REUTERS, Oct.
9, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idUSTRE49895G20081009.
197 id.
198 Id.
199 Id.
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The United States appeal of the panel's ruling against it is cur-
rently pending before the Appellate Body, which should make its de-
termination within 60 to 90 days. Pursuant to Article 17 of the DSU,"an appeal shall be limited to issues of law covered in the panel report
and legal interpretations developed by the panel."2 0 0 Thus, the Appel-
late Body rarely reverses the panel's determinations since it is gener-
ally not authorized to reverse the panel's factual findings.2 °"
After the issuance of the appellate report, China might be re-
quested to implement the suggested recommendations regarding the
issues that bore the violations of the TRIPS. The report might include
a recommendation to prioritize China's customs officer's authority to
destroy seized counterfeit goods, which is currently a mere formality
and a means of last resort. In addition, China would probably be
asked to amend its laws and to provide for copyright protection of all
works, regardless of their stage in the censorship approval process. If
the Appellate Body reverses the panel's finding and finds China's
threshold system illegal, China would probably be requested to refrain
from using the threshold mechanism. Instead, China would be re-
quired to focus on providing criminal prosecution for all willful trade-
mark piracy and counterfeiting occurring on a commercial scale, which
should be estimated not by numerical thresholds but by considering all
relevant factors.
China would have to inform the DSU of the measures it in-
tends to take in order to comply with the recommendations.20 2 In ad-
dition, if the United States further questions China's compliance with
the DSB's recommendations, the DSU panel, preferably the same one
that resolved the initial dispute, should resolve the matter.20 3
Furthermore, if China fails to comply with the recommenda-
tions, or if China's attempts to comply are unsatisfactory, the United
States shall, within a reasonable time established by the DSU, imple-
ment one of the temporary measures, i.e., compensation or withdrawal
of concessions. Since the compensation must be agreed upon by both
the parties and thus is more problematic to achieve, withdrawal of con-
cessions is a preferred method of retaliation. Under Article 20 of the
DSU, the United States must first consider the possibility of retalia-
tion in the sphere of the articles of the TRIPS that were violated and
then within the TRIPS overall. However, if the United States shows
that the retaliation in the same sphere is not going to be effective, it
200 DSU, supra note 42, art. 17.
201 id.
202 Id. art. 21.
203 Id.
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can retaliate in another sphere covered by the WTO and impact IPR
enforcement in China vicariously.20 4
It is important that the United States should choose the target
for retaliation with great caution in order to prevent a self-inflicted
injury. For example, when the United States embargoed exports of
grain into the USSR in response to the latter's war in Afghanistan, the
USSR simply increased its own grain production and imported grain
from Australia.2 °5 Consequently, the United States farmers lost a
vast market for their grain and were injured by their own country's
sanctions against a foreign state. Today, 11.9% of United States trade
revenues result from its dealings with China.20 6 Thus, the WTO sanc-
tions on many of the Chinese products could injure the United States
economy. 20 7
Ideally, China would either implement the DSU's recommen-
dations or the United States and China would reach a compromise.
Although the compromise was not a viable option a year ago when the
United States requested the establishment of the panel, such an opti-
mistic outcome is not so far-fetched today, in the face of the current
global financial crisis. While buyers' capacity around the world has
been declining, China, unable to rely on large profits made from its
aggressive exporting strategies, could be forced to become more hum-
ble and timid in terms of international cooperation. There is a reason-
able probability that it will choose to implement the DSB's
recommendations in order to maintain a stable relationship with other
economies in these financially difficult times.
Therefore, even if the Appellate Body upholds the panel's deci-
sion in favor of China's threshold system, China potentially could
lower its thresholds even more to avoid confrontation with the interna-
tional community and worsening of its economic situation. For exam-
ple, only recently China has severed its fines for IPR violations, which
are expected to be an effective deterrent for intellectual property pi-
rates and counterfeiters.20 8
In addition, valid concerns exist regarding global consequences
of the DSU's decision. On the one hand, the ruling in favor of the
United States may upset the interests of developing countries and di-
204 Id. art. 22.
205 Donald H. Caldwell, Jr., The Export Administration Amendments Act of 1895:
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208 China's Judiciary Improves IPR Protection, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 4, 2008, availa-
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minish their motivation to comply with what they already view as high
standards. At the same time, if the ruling is in favor of China, devel-
oped countries that often get injured by counterfeit goods coming from
developing countries, might loose faith in the TRIPS and the WTO and
deem it ineffective for the purposes of protecting and enforcing IPR.
Although developing countries might be discouraged by the United
States victory, the global nature of the world's economies has made it
impossible for states to exist and develop in isolation. Therefore, de-
veloping states realize that in order to achieve prosperity they need to
respect international standards. Such understanding will most likely
foster compliance rather than total rejection of the WTO standards.
CONCLUSION
The importance of the outcome of the current case becomes
clear when we evaluate modern market development trends, with in-
tellectual property being an expensive commodity, the value of which
often surpasses one of tangible goods. Assuming that the Appellate
Body is going to uphold the panel's decision, taken the interdepen-
dency of countries in the modern economy and seeing China's fast-pace
evolution in its IPR laws, it would be rational for China to comply with
the DSU's recommendations. Thus, China might want to make sure
that its customs officers destroy the seized goods and that IPR protec-
tion extends to creative material regardless of censorship approval.
Such attitudes could be motivated by the DSU's acknowledgment of
China's efforts and recognition of its threshold system as valid under
the TRIPS.
Essentially, the decision of the DSU and its consequences will
reveal, to a certain extent, whether the WTO dispute resolution mech-
anism is effective enough to meet the needs of the twenty first cen-
tury's highly interdependent and complex economies.
